













































































𝐴 = {𝑎%, … , 𝑎(}	is	set	of	options	available	to	the	agent,	and	𝐶(𝑎,)	is	the	set	of	options	that	
are	permissible	if	option	𝑎, 	is	chosen,	then	the	choice	the	agent	faces	involves	normative	
variance	just	if,	for	some	𝑎,, 𝑎/ ∈ 𝐴,	𝐶(𝑎,) ≠ 𝐶(𝑎/).		
One	putative	variety	of	normative	variance	is	the	sort	had	by	options	that	support	
their	own	permissibility.	If	𝑎, ∈ 𝐶(𝑎,),	but	𝑎, ∉ 𝐶3𝑎/4,	for	some	𝑎/ ∈ 𝐴,	we’ll	say	that	𝑎, 	is	
attractively	permissible.	An	attractively	permissible	option	is	permissible	if	chosen.	Another	
putative	variety	of	normative	variance	is	the	sort	had	by	options	that	oppose	their	own	



























to	depend	on	which	option	is	chosen.	Let	𝐴 = {𝑎%, … , 𝑎(}	be	set	of	the	options	available	to	
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23	If	we	create	Joy,	𝑀(𝑎@) = 𝑀(𝑎>),	and	𝑎> ∈ 𝑀(𝑎>)	and	𝑎> ∉ 𝑀3𝑎>4.	




















                                                        
25	If	we	create	Misery,	then	𝑀(𝑎@) = 𝑀(𝑎D),	and	𝑎D ∈ 𝑀(𝑎D)	and	𝑎D ∉ 𝑀(𝑎D).		If	we	do	not	create	
















































































































































































































































































































































































                                                        
46	If,	as	I	believe,	𝑎I	is	not	just	self-conditionally	permissible,	but	self-conditionally	obligatory	








the	improvement	claim	is	inconsistent	with	the	procreative	asymmetry.	Let	𝐽 = L𝑎>, 𝑎>	M	be	
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